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The "Ethics" of Organizational/Institutional Ethics in a
Pluralistic Setting: Conflicts of Interests, Values, and Goals
Roberta Springer Loewy*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the leadoff panelist and author for the symposium, I assume several duties
beyond providing a set-up for discussion of my particular topic. We are an
interdisciplinary group, committed to interdisciplinarity as the best way to gain
the widest range of perspectives towards inquiry into a problematic issue.
However, interdisciplinarity is not immune to a prominent drawback whenever
individuals come together to discuss a knotty problem: the tendency to assume
that, despite their differences, everyone is on the same page concerning basic
concepts. For that reason, I offer provisional definitions of the key concepts I
will be presenting, so that we all have common reference points from which we
can more effectively pursue and refine our discussion of them, even if those
reference points are ultimately rejected or abandoned. To that end, here are my
provisional definitions':
1. Personal morality: the sum total of one's beliefs concerning right,
wrong, good, bad, obligation, etc. One's personal morality is
* often tacit, reflexive, and uni-perspectival within a given
enclave;
* based on one's experiences in the light of one's upbring-
ing (social, that is cultural or spiritual); and
* defended by appeal to a commonly recognized and
accepted authority, such as religion, parents, culture,
other authority figures, etc.
2. Ethics: the study of right, wrong, good, bad, obligation, etc., con-
cerning behavior towards others who may or may not share one's
own personal morality. Ethics
* aims to be explicit, reflective, and multi-perspective and
* requires a broader defense than one's personal morality
because it must ultimately be persuasive to those who do
* Ph.D., Associate Clinical Professor, Bioethics, University of California, Davis. Having originally
trained and practiced as a Critical-Care Nurse (1966-82), Professor Loewy has since earned a B.A. in Liberal
Arts from Skidmore College (1981), an M.A. in Philosophy with an emphasis in Health Care Ethics (1992), and
a Ph.D. in Philosophy and Ethics (1997) from Loyola University, Chicago. She has taught Bioethics in a
number of settings and authored, co-authored, and edited a number of books, articles, and book chapters dealing
with issues at the end of life, hospice, addiction medicine, social justice, the nature of personhood, and the
relationship between persons and society. Despite being a non-physician, she was elected by medical students
into Alpha Omega Alpha, the academic fraternity of physicians, in 2007.
1. Unless otherwise noted these provisional definitions are my own.
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not recognize/accept the same authority, such as
religion, parents, culture, other authority figures, etc.
3. Professional ethics: the study of the ethical obligations entailed by
belonging to a profession. These obligations exist over and above
those obligations that attach to being a person.
4. Bioethics: the study of the ethical relationships and obligations
between humans and the rest of their environment. This study sub-
divides into various branches, for example, environmental ethics,
political ethics, veterinary ethics, medical (or healthcare) ethics, etc.
5. Medical (or healthcare) ethics: the study of the various bio-psycho-
social relationships and obligations between those seeking and those
supplying healthcare.
6. Business ethics: the study of ethics as it relates to the marketplace.
Business ethics concerns the quality of the relationships of a business
to both its internal and external constituencies .
7. Organizational (or institutional) ethics: the study of the ethical
analyses of decisions and actions taken by organizations/institutions.3
Organizational ethics is widely presumed to be a form of business
ethics.4
8. Organizational healthcare ethics: the study of the ethical analyses of
decisions and actions taken by healthcare organizations/institutions.
Organizational healthcare ethics is increasingly presumed to be a
hybrid of business and healthcare ethics.5
The other aforementioned duty is to list the various criteria for "profession"
introduced by our guest speakers (Robert Solomon, Michael Davis, and Mike W.
Martin) and discussed within our small group sessions at last year's inaugural
symposium. Those criteria, early identified and discussed in the medical
literature by Eliot Freidson,6 can roughly be divided into four categories, as
follows:
1. Exclusive service-oriented expertise
0 Exclusivity given by society to the profession and no one
outside the profession may practice it
2. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 111 (Lawrence C.
Becker ed., 1992).
3. ROBERT T. HALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 4 (2000).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE
(1970).
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* Public accountability in return
* Practice has ethical ends (goals) over and above the usual
material ends (goals) associated with either personal reputa-
tion or private reward
2. Special body of knowledge
* Generated largely from within the profession
* On-going discussion/improvement of field and practice
standards through robust exchange in research, literature,
seminars, continuing education, peer-review, etc.
3. Self-governance
0 Control over structure, educational requirements, admission,
standards of practice, licensure, regulation, censure, etc.
4. Fiduciary obligations
* Generic obligations: those generated by virtue of belonging
to the class, "professional" in general
" Specific obligations: those generated by virtue of belonging
to a particular type of profession, such as medical, legal, etc.
" Public obligations: "Profess"ionals must profess their
commitment to those ethical ends (goals) connected to the
exclusive expertise granted by society-often marked by
public swearing of an oath
* Private obligations: bind professionals to be "client-
centered"-that is, to do the best they can for the individual
directly soliciting their expertise
A summary definition of profession suggested to us last year by Professor Davis
drew the attention of a number of his audience.7 I include it here, followed by the
reconstructed version that would result by adopting my distinction between personal
morality and ethics. I think the changes, while slight, reveal the different senses of
the variations of the root words "moral" and "ethics," just in this brief definition
alone. Adhering to this distinction in general would, I think, considerably reduce the
sort of equivocation that occurs (for the most part innocently) in discussion and
argumentation in both ethics and personal morality.
Davis's provisional definition:
A number of individuals in the same occupation, voluntarily organized to
earn a living by openly serving a moral ideal in a morally permissible way
beyond what law, market, morality, and public opinion would otherwise
require.
7. For more detailed information about the 2006 symposium, see SIERRA HEALTH FOUNDATION,
TOWARDS A COMMON GOAL: ETHICS ACROSS THE PROFESSIONS (2007).
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My provisional reconstruction:
A number of individuals in the same occupation, voluntarily organized to
earn a living by openly serving an ethical ideal in an ethically
permissible way beyond what law, market, morality, and public opinion
would otherwise require.
So with these provisional definitions stated and last year's discussion of
criteria for profession briefly reviewed, I turn to the focus of my remarks, which
are intended to open the discussion about mediating between professional ethics
and organizational interests.
II. TOWARDS A MODEL OF ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL HEALTHCARE ETHICS
This article attempts to bring some clarity to the relatively recent
phenomenon of organizational ethics-also known as organization or institu-
tional ethics-in the healthcare setting. To that end, I will review its "pedigree"
(that is, its relation to ethics, business, and healthcare) and then examine some of
the uncritical assumptions often made about that pedigree. I conclude the article
by offering several reasons why, especially in the healthcare setting, organiza-
tional ethics-at least as it is currently envisioned-is deeply problematic.
The relatively recent, but profound, changes in the delivery of healthcare-
especially the growth of intermediary organizational structures, such as health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) that increasingly influence how patients are
treated-have given rise to increased public scrutiny of the interests of
organizations in general and of healthcare organizations in particular.8 To address
this issue, the American Medical Association's (AMA) Institute for Ethics
convened a National Working Group on Healthcare Organizational Ethics.9 The
working group examined systems of ethical reflection that might be brought to
bear in determining "what should count as ethical conduct for the present
8. See, e.g., HMO's Cancel Coverage When You Get Sick (KTLA television broadcast), http://www.
youtube.conwatch?v=_Bxh9W-wyc4 (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Smart Money, 10 Things Your HMO Doctor Won't Tell You, http://www.smartmoney.com/consumer/?
story=200008301 (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Sharon Lerner,
Managed Care Changeover: Bad Rx?, VILLAGE VOICE (New York, N.Y.), Nov. 16, 1999, at 34, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/9946,lerner, 10056,5.html; Pituitary Network Ass'n, HMO Horror Stories,
http://www.pituitary.org/news/hmo-horror_stories.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); News Release, Rand Corporation, Rand Study Finds Backlash Against HMOs Caused Few
People to Bolt from Their Health Plans (Mar. 24, 2005), http://www.rand.org/news/ press.05/03.24.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
9. DAVID OZAR Er AL., Am. MED. ASS'N, ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE: TOWARD A MODEL
FOR ETHICAL DECISION MAKING BY PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2000), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/
mm/369/organizationalethics.pdf [hereinafter ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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generation of healthcare organizations" that provide direct patient care.'0 It is
interesting, and I think of no small import, to note that the working group
specifically excluded from their examination organizations in healthcare that "do
not provide direct patient care"-almost as though there was some tacit, self-
evident ethical distinction between direct and indirect patient care." Thus, their
list specifically excludes insurance companies; some managed care organizations
(MCOs); many governmental agencies (federal and state); all producers and
distributors of healthcare goods; and the various associations of healthcare
professionals."2
Published in 2000 and still featured on the AMA's website, 3 the group's
report identified and examined, among other things, existing sources of models
of ethical decision-making, drawn from traditional western ethics literature.




" Social policy. 4
The working group ultimately concluded that the differences between the
perspectives of these four sources were so significant that they could not be
combined to yield any useful guide for ethical decision-making, even when
limited to only those healthcare organizations that provide direct patient care."
Despite this daunting conclusion, the group suggested that there are a number of
priorities for healthcare organizations that are in the business of providing direct
patient care, and that these priorities can be generated from the four sources listed
above.' 6 Listed in no particular rank or order of importance, these priorities
include:
* Patients' healthcare services;
* Health professionals' expertise;
* Public health;




13. The report is one of the choices on the AMA's completed research projects page. See Am. Med.
Ass'n, Completed Research Projects, http://www.ama-assn.orglamalpub/category/7518.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
14. ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 9, at 4-8.
15. Id. at 8, 17.
16. Id. at 9-11.
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* Advocacy for social policy reform;
* Relationships with clinical staff, management, employees, and
affiliated professionals;
* Organizational solvency/survival; and
* Benefit to the community.1
7
After re-examination of and much discussion about the mission statements
and public commitments of healthcare organizations employing these various
models, the working group concluded that these priorities could reasonably be
ranked in the following order of importance:
1. Patients' Healthcare Services
2. Professionals' Expertise in Clinical Matters
3. Remaining six (variable, depending on context):
* Public Health
* Unmet Healthcare Needs
" Advocacy for Social Policy Reform
* Relationships with clinical staff, management, employees,
and Affiliated Professionals
* Organizational Solvency/Survival
" Benefit to the Community'8
After surveying a variety of empirical data, including these organizations'
choices of ethical decision-making models as well as their own publicly stated
commitments, the working group rejected the now-classic claim, argued by
Milton Friedman, that "there is one and only one social responsibility of
business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in
open and free competition without deception or fraud."' 9 They also seemed
willing to set aside serious discussion of an alternative position that some things
are simply too important to be trusted to the market.20 Rather, the working group
17. Id. at 9-14.
18. Id.
19. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
20. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996);
ERICH H. LOEWY & ROBERTA SPRINGER LOEWY, TEXTBOOK OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS (2d ed. 2004); David T.
Ozar, What Should Count as Basic Health Care?, 4 THEORETICAL MED. 129 (1983). This position was
articulated early on by Arthur Okun. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
(1975).
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endorsed something more akin to a "stakeholder"-type position, which assumes,
among other things, that organizations and institutions may properly be
characterized as moral agents,2' an assumption that Friedman clearly and quite
adamantly rejected. The working group essentially accepted the centerpiece
claims of stakeholder theory as follows:
* business decisions and activities affect many individuals, not simply
shareholders;
* these affected individuals (including employees, managers, customers,
clients, and the wider community) are all, therefore, stake-holders; and
* ergo, businesses have a social responsibility to include all of the
interests of the various stakeholders when deliberating about which
decisions and activities to support."
The working group then proceeded to emphasize that the first priority of the
above rankings should, in fact, out-rank the various interests of all other "stake-
holders," including the organization's bottom line and the well-being of financial
stakeholders.23
About this, their first priority, the working group concluded that "[p]ro-
fessionalism should function to protect moral vulnerabilities that cannot be
safeguarded through either the government or the private sector.,
24
In their somber conclusion of the first section of the report, the working
group cautioned:
At the present time ... the law (to some extent) and social policy (to a
great degree) have given ambivalent or even contradictory guidance to
provider organizations. By encouraging market competition and
organizational accountability for individual patients' care, instead of
responsible cost containment across the entire population, priority has
been tacitly given to enhancing the health of some, especially the well
and wealthy, rather than meeting the health needs of all, including the
sick and poor. In such a system, the patient and community stakeholders
appear to be ranked lower in priority, and the investors, employees,
suppliers, and insurers higher, in spite of the conflict of this ranking with
the priority of health.25
21. R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
BUSINESS 247 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 6th ed. 1999).
22. See EDWARD M. SPENCER ET AL., ORGANIZATION ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE 56-59 (2000).
23. ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 9, at 10.
24. Id. at 6. This assumption seems to have long found acceptance in the fields of medicine and
bioethics, at least here in the United States. I have yet to see compelling evidence that, in a well-functioning
democracy, the government cannot serve this purpose-perhaps even more equitably.
25. Id. at 8.
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It is unfortunately too often the case-especially in the United States, it
seems to me-that once such a careful assessment of a problem identifies a
"system" to be a significant part of a problem, there is too often a sense of
resignation about ever being able to find "live options" that map onto the full
range of alternatives that are actually possible, given a truly humane and
malleable social system that is fundamentally people-centered rather than merely
power-centered. In our overly individualistic society, rather than "take on the
system" (which must include discussion about how the system that the problem is
embedded in affects the realistic options available as solutions to the problem),
there is the tendency to throw up one's hands and blame the system. This serves
merely to "preserve one's moral chastity"26 by allowing one to retreat to a
position that treats the current system as though it were simply an impenetrable
social "given." But a social system is not a "given"; it is purposely created, and it
can be purposely changed. Such creation or change nearly always requires
coordinated effort, not simply the isolated efforts of individuals.
After offering a brief sample case of decision-making based on the priorities
outlined above, the working group concluded their paper by calling for more
active dialogue between organizational decision makers, health professionals,
and the community at large to come to consensus about some fairly foundational
matters.27 This includes not only a clearer understanding of what constitutes
health, the aims of healthcare, and just how these might be ranked, but also of
how to articulate appropriate standards not just for organizations providing direct
patient care, but-one would fervently hope-for those indirectly involved as
well.28
III. SOME WORRISOME ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
HEALTHCARE ETHICS DEBATE
Over the course of my professional career, which lies at the intersection
between medicine and the humanities, I have witnessed a rather rapid rise of two
especially troubling phenomena that, I would argue, most discussions and
deliberations about this issue have, as yet, failed to address adequately:
1. The spread of marketplace language and values to areas beyond what
traditionally has been considered the marketplace.
2. The erosion of medical professionalism.
The first phenomenon is intricately connected with the rapidly increasing-
and increasingly defended-commodification of goods and services. What was
traditionally thought of as public space, public property, and the public "good";
26. ERICH H. LOEWY, THE MYTH OF MORAL CHASTITY (forthcoming 2008).
27. ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 9, at 17.
28. See id.
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body parts and persons; pregnancy surrogates; politicians; and the personae of
sports' teams are increasingly discussed as though they are legitimate
commodities to be bought and sold in the marketplace.29
The second phenomenon, the erosion of medical professionalism, has been
significant and has a number of contributory factors. An obvious one is the
demise of "private practice." Increasingly physicians have decided, for a variety
of reasons (partly economic, partly because of the "managed care" environment)
to become employees of some type of an organization, whether for-profit or not-
for-profit. Another factor is the proliferation of "practitioners" outside of the
medical profession. This includes not only of nurse practitioners, psychologists,
emergency medical technicians, even chaplains, but also of healthcare
organizations (health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organiza-
tions, etc.) and insurance companies, which increasingly constrain the way
medicine is practiced by physicians. Yet another factor is related to the spread of
marketplace values and assumptions. It is the growing tendency of patients to
cherry-pick the services of medical professionals, almost as though they were
shopping from vending machines: if they don't like what one of their medical
professionals suggests or prescribes, they will simply try to get what they want
from the next.
As a result, the once weighty and carefully protected fiduciary relationship
between patient and medical professional has come under assault from various
corners and has been greatly diluted. I consider these two phenomena-the ever
increasing commodification of goods and services, and the erosion of medical
professionalism-to be especially troubling because they are accepted either too
hastily or with too little critical reflection. When this occurs, such assumptions
take on an unwarranted legitimacy that becomes exceedingly difficult to reverse.
Included among these worrisome assumptions are the following:
" "that it is proper to characterize organizations as moral agents,"
"at least to the extent that decisions and actions taken on their
behalf can be evaluated as ethically right or wrong" ;30
* that organizational ethics is an internal and, often times, top-
29. See, e.g., NOT FOR SALE: IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC GOODS (Anatole Anton, Milton Fisk & Nancy
Holmstrom eds., 2000); Milton Fisk, A Case for Taking Health Care Out of the Market, in NOT FOR SALE,
supra; Patrick Bond, Commodification of Public Goods: Critique and Alternatives, Paper Presented to World
Council of Churches Dialogue with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Feb. 14, 2003),
http://www.queensu.ca/msp/pagesProjectPublicationslReports/goods.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Sarah Gilmore, Commodification of the Body and Corporate Discipline, 8 ELECTRONIC J. RADICAL
ORG. THEORY (2004), http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol8-lnew/Gilmore.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Clive Seale et al., Commodification of Body Parts: By Medicine or By Media?, 12
BODY & Soc'Y 25 (2006); Karen McGarry, Mass Media and Gender Identity in High Performance Canadian
Figure Skating, SPORT J., Winter 2005, http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/mass-media-and-gender-identity-
high-performance-canadian-figure-skating (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
30. HALL, supra note 3, at 4.
2008 / Conflicts of Interests, Values, and Goals
down project 3-the emphasis being on "decisions and actions
taken by organizations";
" that the claim that the internal or external members of an
organization's "constituencies" must be taken into consideration
somehow prevents inequitable distributions of benefits and bur-
dens resulting from decisions and behaviors of the organization;"
* that unanimity of interests, values, and/or goals is sufficient to
warrant decisions, behaviors and outcomes as ethical; and
" that the language of services and products (consumerism)
appropriate to marketplace organizations/institutions is equally
appropriate to healthcare organizations/institutions.
While each of these assumptions merits considerable discussion far beyond
what this article will admit, I will limit my remarks to the last assumption which,
in the face of this country's burgeoning lack of access to basic healthcare for all
members of our society, I consider to be the most profound of our ethical defects.
In the interim, because of the brief time we have for discussion, I raise only the
following interrelated topics:
1. One of the most popular approaches in organizational ethics is to try
to bridge the significant differences between the perspectives of
business ethics, professional ethics, law, and social policy by
framing the discussion in the language of stakeholder theory. Can
this approach succeed? In principle? In practice? And if not, why
not?
2. Even if the answers to the first topic are, on the whole, positive, can
a market model of ethical decision-making adequately speak to
allocation and distribution when the goods and services in question
are necessary for persons to be able to participate?
IV. THE (RELATIVELY UNSUNG) BURDENS OF STAKEHOLDER
THEORY FOR HEALTHCARE
In most basic introductory courses to business ethics, the definition of
stakeholder theory is fairly uncontroversial: viz, that all stakeholders in an
organization have a fundamental right to respect and, therefore, an organization's
management has a responsibility to treat all stakeholders-in the language of
Immanuel Kant-"always as an end and never as a means only. ' ' 33 The initial
31. See Simon Zadek, Balancing Performance, Ethics, and Accountability, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 1421
(1998).
32. See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 111.
33. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46-49 (Lewis White Beck
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problem comes, not surprisingly, in identifying who are to be counted as
legitimate stakeholders, and this depends on whether one adopts a narrow or
wide definition of stakeholder. If a narrow definition is adopted, a stakeholder
will be defined as "[any individual or group vital to the survival and success of
the corporation. '34 Whereas if a wide definition is adopted, a stakeholder will be
defined as "[a]ny individual or group whose interests can affect or are affected
by the corporation."33
Clearly, the AMA's working group assumes this wider definition in their
report. However, most organizations, even if they adopt this wide version in
principle, simply do not take it seriously in practice. For example, the American
College of Healthcare Executives' code of ethics specifically affirms that
1. healthcare executives' responsibilities to patients must include
demonstrating "zero tolerance for any abuse of power that
compromises patients";36 and that
2. healthcare executives' responsibilities to community and society
must include working to
a. "identify and meet the healthcare needs of the community"
37
b. "support access to healthcare services for all people. 3s
From my own experiences and the experiences of those around me, these
sections of their code are cynical, hypocritical, the product of organizational self-
deception on a grand scale, fabulous fiction, or some combination thereof.
But I am hardly the only critic of stakeholder theory; there are critics from
across the political spectrum. Examples on the right include the likes of Milton
Friedman39 or Elaine Sternberg, both of whom argue that, in Sternberg's words,
stakeholder theory is "intrinsically incompatible with all substantive objectives,
and undermines both private property and accountability., 40 Examples on the left
include not only proponents of classic Marxist thought but also more moderate
thinkers whose concerns run the gamut from corporate paternalism;4' to lack of
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (emphasis added).
34. An Introduction to Business Ethics, Chapter 3: Corporate Social Responsibility, www.cbu.edu/
-pmaloney/Phil323/IBECh3.ppt (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Philip J.
Maloney, an Associate Professor at Christian Brothers University, provides these definitions in a presentation
for one of his classes. See id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. AM. COLL. OF HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVES CODE OF ETHICS § II.E (2007), http://www.ache.org/ABT_
ACHE/ACHECodeEthics-2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Id. § V.A.
38. Id. § V.B (emphasis added).
39. See Friedman, supra note 19.
40. Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 3, 3 (1997).
41. See Christopher Stoney & Diana Winstanley, Stakeholding: Confusion or Utopia? Mapping the
Conceptual Terrain, 38 J. MGMT. STUD. 603 (2001).
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effective channels of communication for truly effective "consumer" negotiation,
especially when it comes to unilateral changes by organizations of the terms of
the relationship;42 to the coerciveness of the oftentimes extremely limited
offerings of third parties (e.g., an employer's "choices" of healthcare coverage
for employees).
V. WHY THE MARKETPLACE PARADIGM IS ETHICALLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR
ALLOCATING AND DISTRIBUTING HEALTHCARE
Professor Erich H. Loewy, my husband and professional colleague, has
argued for decades that, in order for there to be a marketplace, there are some
foundational benefits and burdens that must be equitably borne by members of a
society. 43 The most important of these are having one's basic bio-psycho-social
needs (as opposed to mere wants or tastes) met. 44 While basic biological needs
are fairly similar across widely disparate cultures-and so, one might say, are
relatively context-independent-basic psychosocial needs (what Loewy calls
"second-order necessities": e.g., education, healthcare) will vary considerably,
depending on the relative peculiarities and complexities of the society in
question.45 Thus, what is meant by basic needs, here, is those things that are
essential for the possibility of sustaining both a primitive biological existence
(and its goals) and a psychosocial existence that actively nurtures individuals to
maximize their talents and to pursue their interests and goals. Absent having such
basic needs met, individuals cannot participate in the marketplace.
For example, having a car in a technologically advanced society committed
to a well-functioning public transportation system would not be considered a
basic second-order need (one might even consider it a liability). Here in the
United States, where public transportation is both spotty and poor, one could
argue that lacking a car is an inequitable burden. On the other hand, having
access to a cardiac by-pass may be considered an exotic luxury and not a basic
need in a technologically unsophisticated society that has no cars, relies on
manual labor, lots of physical exercise, etc. Loewy's contention, then, is that the
more complex the society, the greater may be the extent of what are considered
to be basic needs.4 The ethical corollary to his contention is that when their basic
needs go unmet, individuals are stultified in profound ways and, thus,
unnecessarily suffer. In the face of such unnecessary suffering a decent society
42. See James A. Fitchett, Buyers Be Wary: Marketing Stakeholder Values and the Consumer (Univ. of
Nottingham, Int'l Ctr. for Corporate Soc. Responsibility, Research Paper Series No. 19-2004, 2004),
http://www.nottingham.ac.uklbusiness/ICCSR/pdf/ResearchPdfs/19-2004.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
43. ERICH H. LOEWY, FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY: THE ETHICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 92-97 (1993).
44. ERICH H. LOEWY, SUFFERING AND THE BENEFICENT COMMUNITY 87-100 (1991).
45. Id. at 98.
46. Id. at 94-95.
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will feel it ethically incumbent to arrange its institutions in such a way as to
guarantee that a certain level of basic needs-both first-order and second-order
necessities-will be met for all of its members. 47 This brings us back to the
marketplace and those things necessary for it to flourish. According to Loewy,
the success of the marketplace depends upon the broadest possible base of
consumers who
1. "have sufficient funds to enter [and compete in] the market";
2. "are sure of what they want and need";
3. "are able to judge quality and price according to a standard";
4. have sufficient "time to deliberate, compare and 'shop around"'; and
5. can safely assume that, if they make a "bad" choice, it will not kill
them.4
Generally speaking, when such minimal conditions are met, not only will the
marketplace function well, but also it will tend to maximally benefit all.
However, it is far from clear that any of these minimal conditions can be met
within any healthcare setting. Consider the following:
1. A large and growing segment of our population here in the United
States does not, in fact, have sufficient funds, individually, to enter
and compete in the healthcare market. 9
2. While an individual may be quite sure of what she wants and needs
when it comes, for example, to a good pair of shoes, she is
incapable-even if she had the relevant medical expertise-to decide
how she should be treated for a serious (or even not so serious, I
would argue) illness. While she certainly may be quite capable of
articulating her long-term interests, values, and goals, it is highly
speculative whether she can determine the biomedical means most
likely to support her pursuit of them.0
47. Id. at 121-24.
48. Erich H. Loewy, Of Markets, Technology, Patients and Profits, 2 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 101,
105-07 (1994) [hereinafter Loewy, Of Markets].
49. See ACCESS PROJECT, PAYING FOR HEALTHCARE WHEN YOU'RE UNINSURED 1 (2003), http://www.
accessproject.org/payingjfor healthcare-when-youre-uninsured.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Erik Siemers, Study: Duke City's Uninsured Charged Higher Fees for Meds, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., July 11,
2006, http://www.abqtrib.comlnews/2006/julll l/study-duke-citys-uninsured-charged-higher-fees/ (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review); Liz Pulliam Weston, A Survival Guide for the Uninsured, MSN.MONEY, June 20,
2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Insurance/InsureYourHealth/AsurvivalGuideForTheUninsured.aspx
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
50. Loewy, Of Markets, supra note 48, at 105-07.
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3. The average patient does not have the ability to judge the quality and
price of healthcare.5
4. It is entirely unrealistic to suppose that consumers would have
sufficient time to "shop around" for the best healthcare "deal" they
could get-even if they could satisfy the above three conditions. 2
5. Lastly, patients cannot assume that they would survive a "bad"
choice. 3
In addition to these five differences, there is another significant difference
between the marketplace and the healthcare setting: in the marketplace, the buyer
and consumer of an item are ordinarily (unless the item is a gift) one and the
same person. Today, the buyer of a healthcare plan is rarely the same person as
the actual "consumer." Rather, the buyer (for example, the employer) is in the
market to get the "product" at the lowest price; whereas the "consumer" (the
patient) would presumably hope to get the best "product." This is hardly the
usual marketplace scenario.
Bluntly speaking, "[t]he empirical data strongly suggest that the implicit
'caveat emptor' strategy of the marketplace-viz., 'let the buyer beware'-is
clearly an inadequate method of exchange for at least some social goods and
services.54 This brings me back to one of the most worrisome assumptions of the
working group's report: the priority ranking of unmet healthcare needs. 5 My
question is who are the people with unmet healthcare needs? In this country, I
fear, many of them are not even recognized as "patients" since, without the
"proper credentials"-in the language of stakeholder theory-they are not
customers, they are not clients, they are not stakeholders, they cannot get by the
non-professional clerk at the front desk in order to draw the attention of a
professional's clinical expertise. When, in the course of their routine day,
professionals end up "seeing" only those persons who have already been pre-
qualified as patients, any chance of professional expertise serving as a brake on
the economic priorities of the marketplace is quite effectively foreclosed.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 102-07.
54. Roberta Springer Loewy & Erich H. Loewy, Playing the HMO Language Game: Repatriation,
Extradition, or Deportation?, in CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS FROM ETHICAL, ECONOMIC AND CROSS
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 127, 138 (Erich H. Loewy & Roberta Springer Loewy eds., 2001).
55. To jog your memory, the group's reconstructed ranking gave top priority to patients' healthcare
services and second priority to professionals' clinical expertise. Unmet healthcare needs was listed with the
remaining six, to be prioritized variably, depending on context. See ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 9, at
9-14 and accompanying text.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 39
VI. CONCLUSION
In closing, I would like to offer a final set of definitions from Avishai
Margalit-a set that I fervently believe is more than provisional. I offer also an
admonition from Hans Jonas which, while it deals with technology in general,
has relevance for all modem organizations and institutions today. So, first I quote
Margalit's definitions and their corollary:
A civilized society is one whose members do not humiliate one another,
while a decent society is one in which the institutions do not humiliate
people.56
And,
[T]here is something outlandish about the idea of a market society as a
decent society: in a democratic society political institutions are justified
precisely by the fact that they are meant to protect the members of the
society from humiliations generated by the market society. This includes
safeguards against poverty, homelessness, exploitation, degrading work
conditions, and the unavailability of education and health services for
those "sovereign consumers" who are unable to pay for them. In
developed societies, the market society is the problem rather than the
17solution .S
And, finally, I speak to Hans Jonas' admonition. Throughout his career, and
culminating in his 1984 text, Jonas warned of a grave, new responsibility facing
humankind: the responsibility of finding a workable ethic for this truly novel age
of technology-where for the first time in human history our decisions and
actions could actually result not just in the disadvantaging of others, but in the
destruction of our world.58 Jonas argued that to survive, we must resist our
current focus on our theories of rights, unbridled autonomy, and individualism,
and concentrate on developing, instead, a workable, practical theory of personal
and social responsibility.59 Such a theory, according to Jonas, would be one that
would take seriously and address the need for organizations and institutions,
when determining what would constitute legitimate versus illegitimate goal-
settings, to take into account the long-term and widespread costs of their
decisions and actions. 60
56. AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 1 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).
57. Id. at 22.
58. See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS FOR THE
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE ix-x (Hans Jonas & David Herr trans., 1984).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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In a pluralistic, democratic society, the best way to ensure that such a theory
of responsibility is taken seriously requires, at the very least, complete
transparency of organizations and institutions to public scrutiny. This would help
to assure that the long-term consequences of their decisions and actions (which
could be irrevocably life altering-for good or for bad) be distributed in such a
way as to preserve the ground for the possibility of continued existence and well-
being for everyone and everything affected by those decisions and actions. So,
consistent with a workable theory of responsibility, perhaps it would not be too
much to expect that healthcare organizations and institutions also commit to the
notion that their fundamental obligations must at least include taking into account
the long-term and widespread costs of their decisions and actions. This would
help to minimize the loss of well-being and self-respect of all individuals even
remotely affected. This would go a long way towards approximating both
Margalit's definition of a decent society and Loewy's conception of the
beneficent community.
